We study the dynamics of an innovative industry when agents learn about its strength, i.e., the likelihood that it gets hit by negative shocks. Managers can exert risk-prevention e¤ort to mitigate the consequences of such shocks. As time goes by, if no shock occurs, con…dence improves. This attracts managers to the innovative sector. But, when con…dence becomes high, less managers exerting low risk-prevention e¤ort also enter. This accelerates the growth of the industry, while inducing a decline in risk-prevention. The longer the boom, the stronger the con…dence, the larger the losses if a shock occurs. While the above dynamics arise in the …rst best, with asymmetric information there is excessive entry of ine¢ cient managers, earning informational rents at the expense of e¢ cient managers. This in ‡ates the innovative sector and increases its vulnerability. 
Introduction
As vividly illustrated by the boom and bust of the …nancial sector in the recent decade, innovations can spur rapid growth as well as declining standards, accumulated risk, and …nally crises. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the dynamics of innovations and risk. Innovations, by their very nature, are initially untested. Market participants are initially uncertain about the strength, potential and workings of an innovation. 4 They progressively learn about it. Innovative resecuritization techniques o¤er a good illustration of initial uncertainty and the scope for learning. CDOs of ABSs o¤ered new ways to reallocate risk, potentially enhancing risk sharing and liquidity. But the reliability and e¤ectiveness of this innovation was not fully clear ex-ante. It depended, in particular, on the degree of correlation between the property markets in di¤erent American cities, a parameter about which there was uncertainty. Awareness of uncertainty about the strength of …nancial innovations was displayed in a "School Brief" published in The Economist, in 1999, "Some of the new …nancial technologies are, in e¤ect, e¤orts to bottle up considerable uncertainties. If they work, the world economy will be more stable. If not, an economic disaster might ensue." Quoted in The Economist, September 7th, 2013, page 57
Motivated by these stylized facts, we study uncertainty and learning about the fragility of an innovative industry, i.e., the likelihood that it is hit by negative shock. More precisely, we assume that, with some probability the innovation is strong, while with the complementary probability it is weak. When the innovation is weak, there is a signi…cant risk of negative aggregate shocks, reducing the productivity of all projects in the innovative sector. When the innovation is strong, the likelihood of such negative shocks is lower. As long as there is no aggregate shock, con…dence in the strength of the innovation increases. This leads to an increase in the size of the innovative sector. In contrast, when negative shocks occur, this generates pessimism and leads to a decline in the size of the innovative sector. 5 Our model features managers and investors. The latter can invest directly, using standard and well known vehicles. Alternatively, they can delegate the care of their investments to managers in the innovative sector. Unlike investors, managers have the skills necessary to operate in the innovative sector. Also, when selecting investments in that sector, they can exert costly risk-prevention e¤ort, to reduce downward risk. This is in line with investment situations with bounded upside in which the key is to prevent an unusually low downside. This applies, in general, to the need for due diligence in the purchase of assets, whereby failure to inspect an asset may fail to uncover some hidden ‡aw.
This …ts particularly well the purchase of …xed income securities. For example, when investing in a portfolio of CDOs, or high yield bonds, the manager can carefully scrutinize the quality of the paper he invests in. Alternatively, if not exerting risk-prevention e¤ort, the manager relies on readymade evaluations, such as those obtained from credit rating agencies. We consider a continuum of heterogeneous managers. Some have e¢ cient risk-management systems, so that, for them, riskprevention e¤ort is not very costly. Others have less e¢ cient risk-management systems and incur larger costs when they exert risk-prevention e¤ort. 5 Thus our analysis is in line with Zeira (1987 Zeira ( , 1999 , Rob (1991) , Pastor and Veronesi (2006) , and Barbarino and Jovanovic (2007) , who show that learning induces ‡uctuations in industry size.
Our key assumption is that the bene…ts of risk-prevention e¤ort materialize when the innovation is subsequently hit by a negative shock. When there is no negative shock, innovative projects fare well, even when managers exerted low e¤ort. When a negative shock hits, the projects whose managers exerted high risk-prevention e¤ort are relatively robust, while the other projects are highly likely to fail. This assumption …ts the stylized facts from the Tech boom and bust. Market participants who invested undiscriminately in dot.com ventures fared relatively well until the bust of March 2000, but then incurred large losses. Another example is momentum-like trading, where, instead of conducting fundamental analysis, fund managers invest in stocks that previously fared well. While such strategy can generate pro…ts in lenient market environments, it runs the risk of large losses when the market is hit by a negative shock. 6 Similarly, institutions which purchased mortgage backed securities based on super…cial risk controls and ready-made evaluations such as ratings, made large losses only when the crisis hit, in the summer of 2007. In contrast, those professional investors and investment banks who scrutinized quality lost much less.
For clarity and simplicity, we …rst analyze the case where e¤ort is observable and contractible. Then we turn to the moral hazard case. With symmetric information, we obtain the following equilibrium dynamics. Initially, when con…dence is low, only managers with e¢ cient risk-management systems enter, and they exert high risk-prevention e¤ort. At some point, con…dence becomes so high that entry becomes pro…table for managers with less e¢ cient risk-prevention systems, exerting low e¤ort. This accelerates the growth of the innovative sector, while inducing a decline in risk prevention standards.
Thus, our theoretical analysis yields the following implications:
6 Daniel and Moskowitz (2012) …nd that momentum strategies earn negative returns when markets are particularly volatile and declining. Similarly, Daniel, Jagannathan and Kim (2012) …nd that momentum strategies experience infrequent but severe losses, when the market is turbulent.
After strong cumulated performance there is an endogenous decline in risk-prevention standards, with the strongest decline occuring precisely at the time of the sharpest increase in the size of the innovative sector.
As con…dence increases, there is both a decline in the probability of a negative shock and an increase in the size of the aggregate loss in case of shock. This is consistent with the empirical …ndings of Dell'Ariccia et al (2012) that busts following long booms are worse than those coming after short booms.
When risk-prevention standards start declining, there is an increase in the cross-sectional variance of the probability of default across managers. If the growth of the innovative sector continues long enough, however, the variance of default probabilities across managers eventually declines.
When the return on standard investments is low and investors search for yield, the growth of the innovative sector is stronger, but the size of total losses in case of shock is larger.
As managers are heterogeneous with respect to the cost of e¤ort, while the marginal manager is indi¤erent between the two sectors, infra-marginal managers in the innovative sector earn quasirents, consistent with the …ndings of Philippon and Reshe¤ (2009) . Furthermore, our theory implies that the wage di¤erential between the two sectors should increase with the cumulated performance of the innovative sector.
While the above dynamics arise under symmetric information, in practice innovative industries are likely to be plagued with incentive problems and information asymmetries. The techniques used by managers in the innovative sector are new and di¢ cult to understand for outside investors. The corresponding opacity makes it di¢ cult for the investors to observe, monitor and control the actions of the managers. Therefore, to increase the relevance of our analysis, we extend it to the case where information is asymmetric, as managers'e¤orts and costs are unobservable by investors. In this richer setting, which we refer to as moral hazard, we obtain the following additional implications:
Moral hazard reduces the ability to ensure that managers exert high risk-prevention e¤ort.
At the same time, when con…dence is low, it is not pro…table to invest in the innovation if the manager is to exert low risk-prevention e¤ort. Thus, when initial con…dence is low and incentive problems are severe, there is no investment in the innovative sector. In a sense the innovation is trapped. 7 On the other hand, if con…dence is somewhat larger, the innovation grows faster and the innovative sector is larger with incentive problems than without. In the …rst-best, initially, only managers with e¢ cient risk-prevention systems enter, and they exert high e¤ort. In contrast, under moral hazard, it is di¢ cult to screen e¢ cient managers exerting high e¤ort from less ef…cient managers exerting low e¤ort. This facilitates the entry of ine¢ cient managers, exerting low risk-prevention e¤ort. Such entry fuels the growth of the innovative sector, and in ‡ates its size relative to the …rst best.
In this context, the expected compensation of managers exerting low e¤ort exceeds their productivity. They earn informational rents, at the expenses of the e¢ cient managers exerting high e¤ort. 7 In our analysis, as in the cascade model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) or the multiplayer bandit of Bolton and Harris (1999) , agents don't internalize the positive externalities their own experimentation creates for others.
But what precludes optimal experimentation in the present model is moral hazard, which di¤ers from Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) or Bolton and Harris (1999). This situation is bene…cial for the ine¢ cient managers who would not have been hired in the …rst best, but it is socially costly, as it increases the vulnerability of the innovative sector and the aggregate loss in case of shock. While our theoretical model could also be applied to non…nancial innovations, it is particularly appropriate to describe and analyze the dynamics of innovations in the …nance sector. Three of the most important features of …nancial innovations play a key role in our analysis: First, risk-control and management are key to the success of …nancial innovations, and it is precisely these activities which the managers of our model are in charge of. Second, the complexity and nonphysical nature of …nancial innovations make it di¢ cult for outside investor to observe …nance sector managers actions, which generates moral hazard, as in our model. Third, when …nancial innovations prove to be weak, this generates severe losses for a large cross-section of …nancial institutions, again as in our model.
Our theoretical analysis shows that, with imperfect markets, the equilibrium size of the …nancial sector can exceed its …rst best counterpart, as in Bolton et al (2013) and Atkeson et al (2013) . Yet, our analysis and theirs involve markedly di¤erent economic mechanisms. In our paper it is the entry of managers exerting low-risk prevention e¤ort that in ‡ates the …nancial sector, while in Bolton et al (2013) it is the fact that dealer's entry in the opaque OTC market worsens adverse selection in the transparent market, and in Atkeson et al (2013) entry is excessive because of congestion externalities.
Our model involves learning, as in Diamond (1991) , Noe and Rebello (2012) , Persons and Warther (1997) and Berk and Green (2004) . Again, our analysis involves very di¤erent economic mechanisms, and generates qualitatively di¤erent results. In particular, Diamond (1991) 's result that agents are less likely to be of the risky type after good performance contrasts with our result that risk-prevention standards decline after good performance. Similarly, while in Noe and Rebello (2012) the incentives of the agent improve as the …rm is perceived to be less vulnerable, in our model it is the opposite. Also, while in Persons and Warther (1997) there is positive skewness in the distribution of outcomes across innovations, so that most innovations perform worse than expected, in our analysis, there is negative skewness: after good performance, managers switch to low risk-prevention, creating the risk of unlikely but large aggregate losses. Finally, in Berk and Green (2004) , learning about the skills of an individual manager drives the amount of funds this manager is entrusted with. In contrast, we model learning about the industry, driving the aggregate amount of funds delegated to managers. In this context, unlike in Berk and Green (2004) , aggregate industry risk varies re ‡ecting i) the likelihood that the industry is strong and ii) the aggregate level of risk-prevention e¤ort.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 examines the case where e¤ort is observable.
Section 4 turns to the moral hazard case. Section 5 concludes.
The model 2.1 Agents and goods
Consider an in…nite horizon economy, operating in discrete time at periods t = 1; 2; ::. At each period, there is a mass-one continuum of competitive managers, indexed by i 2 [0; 1], and a mass-one continuum of investors. All are risk neutral and have limited liability. In the basic version of our model, with symmetric information, equilibrium is the same irrespective of whether agents live oneperiod or many. When we turn to the moral hazard case (in Section 4), to simplify the contracting problem, we assume market participants live only one period and, at the beginning of each period, a new generation is born. 8 At the beginning of each period, each investor is endowed with one unit of investment good, while managers have no initial endowment. Investors can invest their initial endowment themselves, an option we hereafter refer to as "self-investment." The rate of return on self-investment is denoted by r, i.e., 1 unit of investment good yields 1 + r units of consumption good. Alternatively, each investor can decide to delegate the management of her investment good to a manager operating in the innovative sector. Each manager can handle only one unit of investment -this is the simplest way to model decreasing returns to scale, in the same spirit as Berk and Green (2004) . Managers that are not in charge of investments remain in their initial occupation, with opportunity wage normalized to 0. At the end of each period, all market participants consume their share of the consumption good.
Uncertainty and learning
When a new technology is discovered, its quality is initially untested. Before agents have been able to experiment with it, they are uncertain how it will fare in various circumstances. Correspondingly, agents must learn about the strengths and weaknesses of the innovation. We consider the case where the innovation can be weak or strong and model learning as follows.
Each period, the innovative sector can fare well, which is denoted by = 0. Alternatively it can be hit by a negative aggregate shock (denoted by = 1), reducing the expected productivity of all innovative projects. 9 Initially the likelihood of shocks is uncertain, but all market participants know 8 Dynamic contracting under moral hazard and learning can generate rich but complex phenomena. In particular, unobserved shirking can create a wedge between the beliefs of principals and agents. Hege (1998, 2005) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) o¤er insightful analyses of this problem. 9 Hereafter, for brevity, we sometimes omit the quali…er "negative", but when we simply write "shock"we always refer that the innovation can be strong or weak and that strong innovations are less prone to negative shocks than fragile ones. More precisely, when the innovation is strong, the probability of a negative shock is 1 p. When it is fragile this probability is 1 p > 1 p.
Throughout the paper we assume the occurrence of shocks is observable and contractible. Hence, market participants use past realizations to conduct Bayesian learning about the strength of the innovation. At the beginning of the …rst period (t = 1), they start with the prior probability 1 that the innovation is strong. For t > 1, denote by t the updated probability that the innovation is strong,
given the returns realized in the innovative sector at times f1; :::; t 1g. When there is no shock, the probability that the innovation is strong is revised upward to:
If there is a negative shock, the probability that the innovation is strong is revised downward to
Thus, p > p is a key assumption in our model. It implies that weak innovations are more exposed to negative shocks than strong ones, and consequently that when shocks are rare the innovation is likely to be strong. At each point in time t, the problem faced by all market participants is the same as at t 1, except for the di¤erence in the probability that the innovation is strong. The dynamics of the probability ( t ) that the innovation is strong is one to one with that of the updated probability of a negative shock t = 0, then t = 1 p. When, the innovation is known for sure to be strong, i.e., t = 1, then t = 1 p.
E¤ort, output and costs
Each agent i can exert high e¤ort (e i = e) or low e¤ort (e i = e). For simplicity, we normalize e to 1. If there is no shock, for all projects the realization of the output variableỸ is Y > 1 + r with probability 1, irrespective of e¤ort. If there is a negative shock, with probability + (1 e i ) 1 e a project fails and the realization ofỸ is 0. With the complementary probability the project is successful and the realization ofỸ is Y . High managerial e¤ort leads to an improvement in the distribution of output in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance. We interpret this in terms of risk-prevention.
For example, in a …nancial context, fund managers and bankers can spend e¤ort and resources on risk-analysis. Such high e¤ort enables them to screen investment opportunities and avoid those with a large failure risk. In contrast, e i = e corresponds to weak risk-management practices such as, e.g, exclusive reliance on external credit rating agencies, backward-looking measures of risk or failure to conduct adequate stress-tests as discussed in Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) . Such lack of fundamental valuation and risk analysis exposes investments to larger downside risk in case of negative shocks.
While managers all have access to the same type of investment project, they are heterogeneous with respect to the e¢ ciency of their risk management systems. When exerting e¤ort e i , manager i incurs non-monetary cost e i C i . C i is distributed over [C; C] with cdf F . Managers with high Cs have ine¢ cient risk-control systems, making it di¢ cult and costly for them to screen out bad investment projects.
It is very di¢ cult for outside investors to observe and monitor the e¢ ciency of …nancial …rms' risk-management systems. In fact, it is even di¢ cult for supervisors, that are explicitly in charge of such monitoring, and assign teams of highly competent examiners to conduct this task. 10 To re ‡ect this di¢ culty, we assume, thoughout the paper, that costs (C i ) are unobservable by investors. When e¤ort is observable, private information on C i does not a¤ect equilibrium outcomes, because returns, for a given level of e¤ort, are una¤ected by C. In contrast, when e¤ort is not observable, asymmetric information on C i a¤ects equilibrium outcomes, as analysed below, in Section 4.
The unfolding of uncertainty in each period t is illustrated in Figure 1 . As can be seen in the …gure, when the manager exerts high e¤ort, the project can fail only with probability t . Thus, expected surplus (gross of the managerial cost of e¤ort and the outside opportunity wage) is
The larger the probability of a shock, the higher the value of risk-prevention. Thus, t t Y , the expected surplus under low e¤ort, is decreasing in t .
Throughout the paper we assume output realizations are observable and contractible. Within each period t, the sequence of actions is the following:
Investors and managers start with the same belief t that the innovation is strong.
Investors and managers meet in the labour market.
Managers who have been hired exert high or low e¤ort.
There is a negative shock or not, and this is observable by all market participants.
For each project, the investment is successful and yields Y or fails and yields 0.
The dynamics of innovative activities when e¤ort is observable
In this section we consider the case where e¤orts (e i ) are observable and contractible, so that there are no incentive problems.
Equilibrium
Investors and managers meet in the labour market. There are two submarkets, one for managers exerting high e¤ort, the other for managers exerting low e¤ort. We denote by m the compensation contract for managers hired to exert high e¤ort, and by m the contract for low e¤ort. For simplicity we assume market participants are competitive. Thus, they take the equilibrium contracts as given.
The equilibrium condition is that labour supply equals labour demand. Labour supply in a given submarket is the mass of managers who (weakly) prefer to be hired in that submarket rather than not being hired or operating in the other submarket. Labour demand is the mass of investors who (weakly) prefer to invest in this market rather than self-investing or operating in the other market.
Market clearing implies
When t t Y 0, (6) means that investors are indi¤erent between self-investment, investment with high e¤ort and investment with low e¤ort. When t t Y < 0, it means investors are indi¤erent between self-investment and investment with high e¤ort. To see why (6) is necessary for market clearing, consider the case where t t Y < 0. In that case suppose we had E[ mj e; t ] < t . Then all investors would prefer to hire managers to exert high e¤ort, i.e., labor demand in the market for managers exerting high e¤ort would be equal to one. Yet, labour supply could not exceed
which is the mass of managers with cost of e¤ort C i < E[ mj e; t ]. Since this mass is strictly lower than one, the market would not clear. Thus, when t t Y < 0, market clearing entails E[ mj e; t ] = t as illustrated in Figure 2 . Similar arguments apply for the other cases.
(6) implies that, whenever an investor hires a manager, the latter captures all the surplus generated by their interaction. This is in line with Berk and Green (2004) where the economic rents ‡ow through to the managers who create them, not to the investors who invest in them. In both papers the result re ‡ects the assumption that, while all investors are equal, managers are heterogeneous. This is a realistic assumption. What investors bring is cash. One dollar from one investor can't be very di¤erent from one dollar from another investor. In contrast, what managers bring is their skills. It's quite natural and plausible that di¤erent managers will have di¤erent skills, and that there is not an in…nite supply of highly talented managers. We capture such scarcity and heterogeneity by assuming each manager can handle only one project and managers have di¤erent Cs.
Manager i applies for a job requesting high e¤ort if
while she applies for a job requesting low e¤ort if
and otherwise chooses to remain in her initial occupation. Hence manager i choosing between highe¤ort, low-e¤ort and staying out of the innovative sector obtains the following expected gain
Substituting (6) into (9), the expected gain obtained by manager i in the innovative sector is
Since (10) is also equal to the social value created by the employment of manager i in the innovative sector, we have that market equilibrium is Pareto optimal. It is natural, since the market is competitive and frictionless, that the …rst welfare theorem holds.
Denoting,
(6), (7) and and (8) imply that managers choosing high e¤ort are such that,
while managers choosing low e¤ort are such that
De…ne^ as the probability of a negative shock such that t = t = t . Simple computations yield
To focus on the interesting case, we assume that^ is in the support of ,i.e., 1 p <^ < 1 p.
t increases linearly in t , while t and t decrease linearly. These functions are as illustrated in Figure 3 . Inspecting the …gure and using conditions (11) and (12), one sees that, for t >^ , managers with C i t choose to be employed to exert high e¤ort, while managers with C i > t prefer to stay out of the innovative sector. For t ^ , managers with C i t choose to be employed to exert high e¤ort, managers with t C i t choose to be employed to exert low e¤ort, and managers with C i > t prefer to stay out of the innovative sector. Thus, noting that t declines as long as the industry is not hit by a negative shock, we can state our …rst proposition.
Proposition 1 When t ^ , all agents hired to manage investment exert high e¤ort, and their expected compensation, E[ mj e; t ] = t as well as their mass, F ( t ), grow as long as the industry is not hit by a shock.
When t <^ , while a mass F ( t ) of agents exert high e¤ort, a mass F ( t ) F ( t ) exert low e¤ort.
The former earn expected compensation, E[ mj e; t ] = t , while the latter earn E[mje; t ] = t t Y .
Both expected compensations, and also the mass of managers in the innovative industry, grow as as long as the industry is not hit by a shock.
When there is a negative shock, compensation and the number of managers working in the innovative industry suddenly drop.
Managers who are more e¢ cient at controlling risks (with low C i ) are more likely to be employed in jobs requesting high e¤ort. They correspondingly earn larger compensation. Once con…dence has improved so much that t becomes lower than^ , the increase in the fraction of managers exerting low e¤ort tends to push average compensation down. But, controlling for the type of tasks (i.e., high or low e¤ort), compensation continues to grow as long as the innovation is successful.
Infra-marginal rents
Infra-marginal managers'rents are equal to the di¤erence between their expected compensation and their cost of e¤ort. Thus manager i obtains rent equal to
By construction, except for the marginal agent, managers employed in the innovative sector earn strictly positive rents, re ‡ecting the above mentioned scarcity of highly talented managers. Thus we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The expected compensation of managers employed in the innovative sector exceeds the sum of their cost of e¤ort and their outside opportunity wage. The corresponding infra-marginal rents (R(C i ; t )) increase, for all managers, as con…dence in the strength of the innovative sector increases.
The quasi-rents in Corollary 1 re ‡ect managers'heterogeneity, similarly to Berk and Green (2004) .
3.3 Implications of the model with observable e¤ort 3.3.1 Growth and compensation in the innovative sector
As long as there is no negative shock, con…dence in the innovation increases. Proposition 1 implies that this leads to an increase in the mass of agents hired to manage investments. When t gets lower than^ , the innovation is perceived to be so strong that, even with low e¤ort, it can outperform selfinvestment. At that point, there is an acceleration in the growth of the innovative sector induced by good news. Thus, noting that con…dence increases with the time without negative shocks and also with the cumulated performance of the innovative sector, we can state our …rst implication.
Implication 1: The size of the innovative sector is increasing in the time without negative shock and the cumulative performance of the innovation. After sustained performance, there is an acceleration in the growth of the innovative sector.
In equilibrium, the growth of the innovative sector is initially slow, then it accelerates (as managers with high C enter), then it …nally slows down, when (almost) all managers have entered). Thus, there is an S-shape in the growth of the innovative sector, and this without the usual ingredients giving rise to S-shapes, such as spillovers or learning (see, e.g., Rogers, 1962) . Furthermore, since Corollary 1 imply that expected compensation on top of the opportunity wage w 0 increases with the con…dence in the innovation, we can state the following implication.
Implication 2:
As the con…dence in the innovative sector and its size grow, the wage di¤erential between the innovative sector and the other sector also grows.
Our theoretical result that there is a wage di¤erential between the two sectors is in line with the empirical …ndings of Philippon and Reshe¤ (2009) for the innovative …nancial sector. For example, they write, e.g., "…nance workers earn on average 10% more than observationally equivalent workers in the [non…nancial] sector."In addition, our theoretical analysis yields the new empirical implication that this wedge increases in the cumulative performance of the innovative sector.
Deteriorating standards in the innovative sector
While, when t >^ , all managers exert high e¤ort, after sustained success t gets lower than^ , and an increasing fraction of managers are hired without being requested to exert high e¤ort. Correspondingly, when t gets below^ , there is decline in the proportion of managers exerting high risk-prevention e¤ort.
More precisely, when t <^ the average e¤ort level is
which is increasing in t , since F ( t ) is increasing in t while F ( t ) is decreasing. Thus, as con…dence increases (and t goes down), there is a decline in the average level of e¤ort requested, coinciding with a decline in the average e¢ ciency of risk-management systems. Interpreting this as a decline in risk-prevention standards, we obtain the following implication.
Implication 3: After sustained success, there is a decline in risk-prevention standards, starting at the time at which the growth of the innovative sector accelerates.
Implication 3 is consistent with the empirical …ndings of Dell'Ariccia et al (2008) and Gertler, 1998, and Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) . Yet, our analysis shows that agency problems are not needed to rationalize these …ndings. 11 The decline in standards in Implication 3 corresponds to the entry of …nancial intermediaries with weaker and weaker risk-control systems. To test this implication, empirical proxies for the strength of risk-control systems are needed. One could rely on the Risk Management Index developed by Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) . 12
Unlikely but large aggregate losses
The probability of a negative shock ( t ) goes down with the number of periods without shock. For t ^ , the mass of failing projects in case of a negative shock is
This decreases with t , i.e., decreases with the con…dence in the innovation, simply because, as con…-dence grows, more projects are operated in the innovative sector. When t <^ the mass of failures in case of negative shock becomes
which is also decreasing in t . This re ‡ects two evolutions: First, as above, as con…dence increases, the number of projects operated in the innovative sector increases. Second, as con…dence increases, an increasing fraction of the projects is operated with low risk-prevention e¤ort. Thus we can state the next implication.
Implication 4: As the probability of a shock ( t ) declines, the size of the loss in case of shocks increases. After a sustained period of success, when t gets lower than^ , there is an acceleration in the size of the innovative sector and the mass of failures in case of shock.
Our theoretical analysis thus implies that long awaited shocks, that come after a period of sustained performance and growing con…dence, are more severe than shocks happening during the early developments of the innovation. 13 This is in line with the empirical …nding by Dell'Ariccia et al (2012) that busts following long booms are worse than busts coming after short booms. The pattern generated by our model could look like a bubble followed by a crash. Yet it simply re ‡ects how the optimal level of investment and e¤ort adjusts as agents learn about the strength of the innovation.
The cross-section of failure probabilities
For t ^ , the failure probability for each project operated in the innovative sector is t . For t <^ the failure probability in the innovative sector remains equal to t for projects with C i t , but it is t ( + ) for projects with C i > t . Thus, for t <^ , the cross-sectional average default rate in the innovative sector is
This is the product of the probability of shock ( t ) by the cross-sectional average probability of default in case of shock. The latter increases with the con…dence in the innovative sector.
While for t ^ , all managers operating in the innovative sector have the same probability of default: t , for t <^ , a fraction F ( t )=F ( t ) of the managers have default rate in case of shock equal to , while for the others it is + . Hence, for t ^ , the cross-sectional variance of default probabilities in case of shock is 0, while, for lower values of t , it is
As t crosses^ ,
is initially close to one. Then it decreases with further increases in con…dence.
Correspondingly, the cross-sectional variance of default probabilities in case of shock is initially very small, but increases as con…dence builds up. On the other hand, if t decreases enough for
reach 1=2, then further increases in con…dence reduce this cross-sectional variance. The intuition is the following. As long as t >^ , all managers exert high e¤ort, so that there is no cross-sectional variation in the probability of default in case of shock. When t crosses^ from above, an initially small but gradually increasing fraction of managers exerts low e¤ort. Correspondingly, for values of t beloŵ , but not too far from it, heterogeneity in e¤ort exertion across managers increases with con…dence.
But, for very low values of t , the majority of managers exert low e¤ort, and further decreases in t increase this majority, thereby reducing the heterogeneity in default probabilities. Correspondingly, the cross-sectional variance of default probabilities across managers is inverse-U shaped in t . Our next implication summarizes this discussion:
Implication 5: As con…dence in the innovation improves, the average default rate in case of shock increases, while the cross-sectional variance of default rates …rst increases and then decreases.
To test Implication 5, one needs empirical proxies for failure probabilities. One could rely on put options with di¤erent strikes, on credit risk implied by interest rates, or on CDS prices, for the market as well as for individual names.
Search for yield and the dynamics of the innovative sector
When r is low, the return on self-investment is low, which leads investors to search for yield. Other things equal, a decrease in r raises t and^ . This accelerates the entry of managers exerting low e¤ort, and the growth of the innovative industry, but also increases the size of total losses in case of negative shock. This is stated in our next implication.
Implication 6: When r is low, and investors search for yield, the growth of the innovative sector is stronger, but the size of total losses in case of shock is larger.
The dynamics of innovative activities under moral hazard
The equilibrium analyzed above corresponds to the perfect market case. In practice, however, innovative industries are likely to be plagued with information asymmetries. To shed light on the consequences of these problems, we now turn to the case where e¤orts (e i ) are unobservable by investors. 14 We hereafter refer to this situation as moral hazard.
While in the …rst-best it was su¢ cient to consider the expected compensation of managers, under moral hazard, the precise mapping from observable ouctomes to transfers must now be speci…ed.
Because of limited liability, when the realization ofỸ is 0 the compensation of the manager is also 0.
Hence, we need only consider four transfers: m( = 0) paid to the agent requested high e¤ort when he is succesful and there is no shock, m( = 1) when the agent requested high e¤ort is successful in spite 1 4 Our modelling of the unobservability of e¤ort is similar to that in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . In our model, however, unlike in Holmstrom and Tirole, i) the consequences of the level of e¤ort depend on whether there is an aggregate shock or not, and ii) the cost of e¤ort is not observable by investors.
of a shock, and m( = 0) and m( = 1) for the corresponding outcomes when the agent is requested low e¤ort.
Equilibrium
When con…dence in the innovation is strong enough, the expected surplus is so large that the …rst-best allocation is incentive compatible, in spite of the unobservability of e¤ort. To show this, we exhibit a contract, m (o¤ered to managers exerting high-e¤ort as well as to those exerting low e¤ort) that implements the …rst best allocation and is incentive compatible when t is large enough. This contract is such that m( = 1) = Y . Since managers receive all the output in case of shock (which is the only case where e¤ort matters), it is in their own interest to choose the …rst-best level of e¤ort. Consider for example the incentive compatibility condition for high-e¤ort:
that is
With m( = 1) = Y , (16) simpli…es to
which is the condition under which, in the …rst best, a manager entering the innovative sector prefers to exert high e¤ort rather than low e¤ort. Furthermore, given that m( = 1) = Y , investors break even if and only if
This is compatible with the limited-liability constraint that m( = 0) 0 if and only if
Finally, since investors just break even and managers exert the e¢ cient level of e¤ort, managers obtain the entire surplus when they enter the innovative sector. Consequently, it is in their own interest to make the entry decisions that are …rst-best optimal. Thus, we can state the following proposition:
, equilibrium is the same with or without moral hazard.
Hereafter, we restrict attention to the more interesting case where moral hazard matters, i.e, we
focus on values of t above
. An important feature of equilibrium dynamics in the …rst-best is the switch from the equilibrium regime where all managers exert e¤ort (arising for t ^ ), to that in which some exert low e¤ort. Since the choice of e¤ort level is the key decision in our moral hazard model, it is important to consider the values of t for which the switch from high to low e¤ort can occur. Since we focus on t >
. This inequality is equivalent
which we assume hereafter. The interpretation of (17) is the following: The left-hand-side is the additional amount of e¤ort needed to exert high risk-prevention. The right-hand-side is the relative increase in risk avoided by exerting high e¤ort. Condition (17) states that the cost of switching to high e¤ort (proportional to left-hand-side) is relatively large compared to the bene…t (proportional to the right-hand-side). In that case, the switch from high to low e¤ort occurs relatively early. That is,^ is relatively small, smaller than
, under moral hazard, two distinct contracts cannot be o¤ered in equilibrium. Suppose by contradiction that two distinct contracts are o¤ered. Since investors must exactly break even on each contract, the expected pay-o¤s, and the decisions of managers (high e¤ort, low e¤ort, no participation) must be exactly the same as in Proposition 1. Now, Proposition 1 implies that there are two active contracts only when t <^ , and that contract m (compensating high e¤ort) is chosen by all managers such that
Similarly to (16) , the incentive compatibility condition is
for all the managers i choosing contract m. , at most one contract is o¤ered at equilibrium.
Our third, striking, result is that, contrarily to the case where e¤ort is observable, moral hazard implies that there is always a positive fraction of active managers that exert low e¤ort at equilibrium.
Again, the proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose all active managers would exert high e¤ort. Then equilibrium would involves a unique contract, m. m would be such that investors would break even:
and all managers with C i t choose it. Incentive compatibility would require that managers prefer to exert high e¤ort, which is equivalent to (16) . This holds for all active managers if and only if
This is compatible with the investors'break even condition only if
The right-hand-side is negative by assumption (17). The inequality, therefore, is not consistent with limited liability. Hence a contradiction. We can thus state the following proposition: ; there is always a positive fraction of active managers that exert low e¤ort at equilibrium.
We now characterize the equilibrium arising in that case. We know that it must be a pooling equilibrium, in which only one contract, m, is o¤ered and some of the managers accepting it exert high e¤ort while others exert low e¤ort. Denoting
and
the managers who prefer high e¤ort than low e¤ort are those with C i C, while those who prefer to be hired and exert low e¤ort are such that C C i C.
The market clearing condition, requiring that investors earn zero-pro…t, is
where x is the fraction of the managers hired in the innovative sector who exert low e¤ort, i.e.,
A contract such that m( = 0) > 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed an investor could undercut this contract by o¤ering another one with a lower m( = 0) and a larger m( = 1), in such a way that the expected gain for a manager exerting low e¤ort would be the same (leaving C unchanged) while increasing the gain from high e¤ort (thus raising C). This would attract exactly the same managers, but a higher fraction of them would make an e¤ort, thus generating positive expected gains for the investors. Hence, in equilibrium, we must have m( = 0) = 0. Thus, x rewrites as
For simplicity, we assume costs are uniformly distributed over [0; C max ]. 15 Then the fraction of managers exerting low e¤ort simpli…es to
The condition under which investors'expected pro…ts are non-negative is
which simpli…es to
If that condition does not hold, there is a market breakdown and no manager is hired in the innovative sector. The above analysis leads to our next proposition, illustrated in Figure 4 .
Proposition 5: Under moral hazard, when (17) hold and costs are uniformly distributed over
, equilibrium is as follows.
no manager is hired in the innovative sector.
ii) When
there exists a pooling equilibrium, in which only one contract m is o¤ered, a fraction x of the managers working in the innovative sector exerts low e¤ort, and the complementary fraction exerts high e¤ort.
The average expected compensation of managers is given by (23), which increases as con…dence in the innovative sector improves.
The intuition underlying the proposition is the following:
i) When the risk of a negative shock is so high that (24) holds, incentive problems generate an "innovation trap."If e¤ort was observable, it would be feasible to request high e¤ort from all managers.
This would enable investment to take place, which would, in turn, generate learning about the strength of the innovation. Because of moral hazard however, it is impossible to ensure that all managers exert high-e¤ort, therefore investment in the innovative sector is not pro…table. So the innovation cannot develop, and learning cannot take place.
ii) When t is intermediate, while in the …rst best managers exerting low e¤ort and managers exerting high e¤ort would choose di¤erent contracts, under asymmetric information such sorting is not incentive compatible. Hence there is pooling.
Implications of binding incentive problems
The next implication summarizes how moral hazard a¤ects the development of innovations. In line with the above analysis, we focus on the case where t is large and (17) When r declines, the threshold level above which innovations are trapped goes up. Hence, innovations that had become available but had not been able to develop can suddenly get implemented.
Thus, there is a wave of innovations.
While the possibility of market breakdown under moral hazard underlined in Implication 7 is not surprising, the next implication (which stems from part ii) of Proposition 4 and its illustration in Figure 4 ) is more unexpected. ; ), the size of the innovative sector is larger than in the …rst best.
When e¤ort is unobservable but con…dence is not too low, the rate of growth of the innovative sector is larger than in the …rst best. This re ‡ects that many managers enter and exert low e¤ort, which contrasts with the …rst best where e¢ cient managers, exerting high e¤ort, would enter. Thus moral hazard spurs the entry of ine¢ cient managers exerting low e¤ort, which fuels the growth of the innovative sector.
This can lead to a situation where, under moral hazard, the size of the innovative sector is larger than in the …rst best. To see how this obtains, consider , a point at which t > t . Hence, there exists a threshold , such that C > max
Now, in this region, the size of the innovative sector in the …rst best is F (max[ t ; t ]), while in the second best it is F ( C). Hence, for these values of t , the size of the innovative sector is larger under moral hazard than in the …rst best.
The intuitive economic reason why moral hazard in ‡ates the innovative sector is that, as mentioned above, it spurs the entry of managers exerting low e¤ort. This fuels the growth of the sector. On the other hand, it lowers the average expected surplus generated by investments in the innovative sector. One could think this decline in expected surplus would deter investment by principals. This is not the case because, in the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4, there is cross-subsidization of managers exerting low e¤ort by managers exerting high e¤ort. The former receive higher expected compensation than the (negative) surplus they generate for society, while the latter receive lower expected compensation than the (positive) surplus they generate for society. Hence, the expected losses incurred by investors hiring managers who turn out to exert low e¤ort are o¤set by their expected gains when hiring managers who turn out exerting high e¤ort. Thus, in a sense, the excessively in ‡ated growth of the innovative sector is funded by the subsidies of the managers exerting high e¤ort. And these subsidies result in agency rents for managers exerting low e¤ort, as stated in the next implication. Taken together, Implications 8 and 9 contrast with previous theoretical results. To the extent that rents are transfers from principals to agents, they tend to deter investment by managers. In this context, moral hazard reduces the size of the sector relative to the …rst best, as, e.g., in Axelon and Bond (2011) . This is not the case in the present model, where, in contrast with Axelson and Bond (2011) , not only e¤ort but also the cost of e¤ort are unobservable. In this context, the rents earned by ine¢ cient agents are funded by the e¢ cient agents, rather than the principals.
While the in ‡ated growth of the innovative sector is privately optimal for the managers exerting low e¤ort, who would not have been hired in the …rst best, it is socially costly, as it drives utilitarian welfare below its …rst-best level. This social cost materializes when a negative shock hits and large losses are incurred, as stated in the next implication. ; ), default probabilities and aggregate losses in case of shock are higher than in the …rst best.
Conclusion
Our analysis of the dynamics of innovations and risk under learning yields two key insights: First, the strongest growth episodes of the innovative sector are fueled by the entry of managers exerting low risk prevention e¤ort -and therefore correspond to a decline in risk prevention standards. Second, under moral hzard, there is excessive entry of managers exerting low e¤ort and earning informational rents, so that the innovative sector is larger and riskier than in the …rst best.
Thus, in our model, the signature of moral hazard is strong growth at early stages of the development of the innovation. In the …rst best, early growth is slow, because limited con…dence implies only managers exerting high e¤ort should enter. Under asymmetric information, early growth is strong, in spite of limited con…dence, due to the entry of managers exerting low prevention e¤orts, that can't be screened from those exerting high prevention e¤ort.
While the present model features only managers and investors, it would be interesting to extend the analysis by introducing a supervisor or regulator, better able than investors to monitor the managers' risk-management systems. Since under asymmetric information there is excess entry of managers with ine¢ cient risk-management systems, supervisory monitoring could improve welfare by imposing compliance to risk-management standards. When should that occur? Our theoretical analysis suggests that strong growth should not be taken as an encouraging sign that the innovation is healthy, calling for "light-touch regulation." Quite to the contrary, it is in periods of strong growth that resources should be spent to monitor the innovative sector, check risk-prevention standards, and bar entry for institutions with weak risk-management systems.
Also, while our results obtain with rational agents, they could be ampli…ed by psychological biases, such as, e.g., overcon…dence. After a few years without negative shocks, overcon…dent market participants would become excessively con…dent that the innovation is strong. 16 This would magnify the e¤ects we analyze, reduce risk-prevention further, and make the innovative sector more vulnerable. Figure 3 : Equilibrium dynamics without incentive problems β α is the expected surplus generated with high effort (gross of the cost of effort) β is the threshold value of C below which high effort is preferred to low effort γ is the threshold value of C below which delegated investment with low effort is more valuable than self investment. When C i < min [α,β] there is high effort.
When β < C i < γ there is low effort. 
